Abstmct-In this paper, we propose a "bag of system calls" representation for intrusion detection in system call sequences and describe misuse and anomaly detection results with standard machine learning techniques on University of New Mexico (WNM) and MIT Lincoln Lab (MIT LL) system call sequences with the proposed representation. With the feature representation as input, we compare the performance of several machine learning techniques far misuse detection and show experimental results on anomaly detection. T h e results show that standard machine learning and clustering techniques on simple <'bag of system calls" representation of system call sequences is effective and often performs better than those approaches that use foreign contiguous subsequences in detecting intrusive behaviors of compromised processes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Detection of attempts to compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of computing and communication networks is an extremely challenging problem [l] . Most current approaches to the design of intrusion detection systems (IDS) are based on the premise that the actions used in an attempted intrusion can be differentiated from the actions executed by users or processes during the normal operation of the computing and communication networks 121. An effective IDS logs actions executed by users or processes for investigation, alerts the system administrator when the monitored activities are indicative of attempted intrusion, and, if appropriate, takes corrective measures e.g., expelling the intruder.
Intrusion detection and prevention generally refers t o a broad range of strategies for defending against malicious attacks. Intrusion detection can be categorized into misuse detection and anomaly detection. Misuse typically is a known attack, e.g., a hacker attempting to break into an email server in a way that IDS has already trained. A misuse detection system tries to model normal and abnormal behavior from known attacks. It works by comparing network traffic, system call sequences, or other features of known attack patterns. An anomaly is something out of the ordinary, e.g., abnormal network traffic which is actually caused by unknown attacks. An anomaly detection system models n o m a 1 behavior and identifies a behavior as abnormal (or anomalous) IDS can be classified into those that focus on modeling the behavior of users and those that focus on modeling the behavior of processes 13). System call data are one of the most common types of data used to model the behavior of processes. Such data can be collected by logging the system calls using operating system utilities e.g. Linux strace or Solaris Basic Security Module (BSM).
There has been a great deal of research on how to design and implement intrusion detection systems. For example, Mukherjee et al [4] used a combination of host monitors and network monitors with a centralized director for suspicious system activities in the distributed intrusion detection system (DIDS) project. Because it is difficult to manually specify activities that signal intrusive behavior, there has been much work on adaptive or machine learning or data mining approaches for intrusion detection. Forrest et a1 [5] worked on the Computer Immunology project and explored approaches inspired by the activities of the immune systems of animals for detecting and defending against intrusions. Subsequently, several groups have explored data mining approaches for intrusion detection [6], [7] , [SI.
In most IDS that model the behavior of processes, intrusions are detected by observing fixed-length, contiguous subsequences of system calls. For example, in anomaly detection, subsequences of input traces are matched against normal sequences in database so that foreign sequences are detected.
[5], [9] One potential drawback of this approach is that the size of the database that contains fixed-length contiguous subsequences increases exponentially with the length of the subsequences. For example, if the number of system calls is 200 and the length of the subsequences is 6, the maximum size of the database is theoretically 2006 = 64 x words. In practice, only normal subsequences are stored, so actual database size is smaller, but still considerably bigger than the hypothesis size generated by the approach presented here.
In this paper, we explore an alternative representation of system call traces for intrusion detection. We use a bag of system calls representation of system call sequences and consider intrusion detection of system call sequence as a classification problem on a bag of system calls obtained from the system call sequences. With those prob- The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes two different representations of system call sequences. Section 3 describes the benchmark data sets used in our study. Section 4 describes the experimental setup and results. Section 5 concludes with a summary and discussion.
ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATIONS OF SYSTEM CALL

SEQUENCES
We describe two feature representations of system call sequences that intrusion detection algorithms deal with. The first one is a contiguous subsequence with fixed length k from origina1 input traces, and the second is bag of system calls, which is our approach.
One of the main questions in sequence-based intrusion detection is how to define "intrusion" in an input sequence. Most intrusion detection algorithms such as STIDE 118) regard that intrusion is related with fixed-length subsequence that only happens in intrusive traces.
In our approach, we convert the input sequence to bag of system calls. Thus, the ordering information between system calls is lost and only the frequency of each system call is preserved for each input sequence. Intrusion is represented according to the machine learning algorithm applied.
Formally, the intrusion detection problem on system call OT command sequences can be defined as follows:
Let C = {SI, szr ~3 , .
. . s , ) be a set of system calls where rn = /Cl is the number of system calls. Data set D can be defined as a set of labeled sequences { < Z i , c , > JZi E C * , c , E (0, l}} where Zi is an input sequence and c, is a corresponding class label denoting 0 for "normal" label and 1 for "intrusion" label. Given the data set D , the goal of the learning algorithm is to find a classifier h : E* + (0, I} that maximizes given criteria. Widely accepted criteria include accuracy, detection rate and false positive rate.
Because it is difficult to deal with sequences directly, each sequence 2 E C* i s mapped into a finite dimensional feature vector by a feature representation @ : E* + X. Thus, the classifier is defined as h : X -+ (0, I} for data set {< X j , c j > I X E X,cj E {0,1)}.
A. Contiguous Foreign Subsequences
In this approach, a feature is defined as X j = 51x253.. . s k y a substring of Zi, where x 1 s [~k f C and k is a constant. The maximum number of distinct features is 1x1' and each feature X j is assigned a class label ci according to the original sequence Zi.
STIDE uses sliding windows with length k over an original input trace to generate fixed-length substrings as features and constructs a database of the features in the training stage, and decides a test sequence is anomalous if the number of mismatches in the user-specified locality frame (locality frame count), which i s composed of adjacent features in the frame, is more than the user-specified threshold. Empirically, it is widely accepted that, for effective intrusion detection, the minimal value of k is six [19] .
B, Bag of System Galls
"Bag of system calls" representation is an integerfrequency based method. In our approach, a feature is defined as an ordered fist Xi = (cl, c~, c 3 , . . ., c,) where m = (Cl and cJ is the number of occurrence of system call sj in the input sequence Zi.
Thus, the original trace is converted to a bag of system calls, and the ordering information of adjacent system calls in the input sequence is lost and only the frequency of each system call in the bag is preserved. Intrusion in this feature representation is defined according to frequency count of system calls.
One of the main issues in this paper is whether the bag of system calls representation, which is atready popular in text classification and categorization, can effectively represent intrusion. We will show experimental results over University of New Mexico (UNM) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Lab (MIT LL) data in later sections for this issue. It will be shown that frequency information is effective enough to discriminate between normal sequences and abnormal sequences. As an example for this, figure 1 shows a histogram of the average frequency of selected system calls in normal sequences and abnormal sequences in UNM denial of service (DOS) trace data set (also known as stide data set). We found a similar phenomenon for other data sets including MTT LL data sets. 
A. UNM System System Cull Sequences
The University of New Mexico (UNM) provides a number of system call data sets. Each data set corresponds to a specific attack or exploit. The data sets we tested are "live lpr", "live lpr MIT" , "synthetic sendmail", "synthetic sendmail CERT' , and "denial of service" (DOS),
In UNM system call traces, each trace is an output of one program. Sometimes, one trace has multiple processes. In such cases, we have made one sequence per process in the original trace. Thus, multiple sequences of system calls are made from one trace if the input trace has multiple processes in it. However, most traces have only one process and usually one sequence is created for each trace. Table  E shows the number of original traces and the number of sequences for each data set.
There are three different mapping files in UNM call traces. One is Sun (synthetic sendmail, synthetic sendmail CERT, synthetic lpr, live lpr and live ipr.MIT) , another is Linux (live named, login, ps, inet and DOS), and the third is new Linux (synthetic ftp and xlock). There are old and new Sun mapping files but only one system call is added to the new mapping file so both can be easily converted. The Sun mapping file has a few duplicate system calls (e.g. 'fstat', 'stat', etc.), but we changed them so that each system call is unique.
B. MIT Lincoln Lab System Call Sequences
We used data sets provided by the MIT Lincoln Lab 1201. The fourth week (starting at 6/22/98) training data set of year 1998 is used for the experiments in this paper. This training data is comprised of a detailed set of data files representing the state of a particular system over eight-hour daytime periods over the course of the week beginning on 6/22/98. Of interest to this paper is the omnibus data file containing all system calls made during the collection p e riod and the network traffic analysis file (distilled from raw network data) that identifies inbound network connection attempts.
We explain the issues with cross-indexing the data files. MIT Lincoln Labs datasets include omnibus files containing all system call traces. For each omnibus file, there is with a separate, network traffic analysis data file that indicates inbound network connections to the system. Attack attempts are logged with the network data, so labeling of the training data requires cross-indexing this file with the system call trace file. The system call trace file identifies the source of each call using the process ID. Therefore, crossindexing requires tracking the argument to the 'exec' system call identifying the binary to be executed. Additionally, the timestamps from the network traffic analyzer do not exactly correspond to the execution timestamps from the operating system kernel. A tolerance of one second was arbitrarily chosen and seems to permit the matching of a large majority of connection attempts with their corresponding server processes run on the target system.
All processes detected that do not correspond to some network connection attempt identified in the trace are removed from consideration (since they cannot be classified), as are all calls attributed to a process ID for which an 'exec' system call is not found. The resulting data are available at http://www. cs .iastate.edu/-dkkang/IDS-Bag/.
rv. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We use different approaches for three different types of intrusion detection experiments. The approaches will be explained at each respective section.
The data sets we have tested are "live lpr", "live Ipr MIT" , "synthetic sendmail", "synthetic sendmail CERT" , and "denial of service attack" of UNM, and the fourth week training data set of year 1998 in MIT LL. For the evaluation of classifiers generated in the experiment, 10-fold cross validation is used, so no training information is reused in the test stage. In 'x'-fold crossvalidation] the data set is divided into x subsets of approximately equal size. One of the subsets is picked for testing and the rest subsets are used for training. In other words, a classifier is generated from 'x-1' subsets and the classifier is tested over the rest subset. This routine is applied for each of x different subsets, and then accuracy, detection rate and false positive rate are averaged respectively over each of x different subsets tested. This is to ensure that no information used for classifier generation is reused as test data. Accuracy, detection rate, and false positive rate are defined as follows: One of the problems in our bag of system calls representation is that, with some machine kearning algorithms, the classification cannot be done until the end of the process [18] . However, with the machine learning algcrithms that generate comprehensive hypotheses, we can use very simple rules to detect a process that has exhibited intrusive behavior before it is terminated. Figure 3 is the decision tree by C4.5 for the "WNM live Though this simpIe rule does not have a perfect detection rate, it says that "we can guess the input lpr program trace i s an intrusion sequence if the number of occurrences of 'fstat' system calls is more than 5". Therefore, a simple counter program that counts the number of certain system calls can detect intrusion before the process ends. However, unlike the approach that detects foreign contiguous subsequences, the counter program may not detect intrusion just after foreign subsequences are executed. Figure 4 is the decision tree produced by C4.5 for "UNM live lpr MIT" data set. Though both the "UNM live Ipr" data and the "UNM live Ipr MIT" data contain intrusion snapshots by "lprcp" scripts, the generated rule may not always be the same because of different system environments.
The reason that this difference in frequency matters in classification is that the programs compromised by the intruder will have more codes (intrusion codes) which will be executed during the routine execution of the programs, causing a change in the distribution of system calls. In the decision trees of figure 3 and 4, it can be seen that; intrusion lies under 'greater than (>)' arc. It is because adding intrusion codes in the original program increases the counts of those system calls (Lfstat', 'unlink', and 'getuid') in the decision t Tees.
C. Experimental Results on Supervised Anomaly Detection
For supervised anomaly detection, we used one class Naive Bayes algorithm. In one class Naive Bayes, we calculate the probability distribution of the training data instead of the class label conditional probability distribution. For test sequences, we calculated symmetric Kullback-Liebler divergence 1211, 1221 between the learned distribution and the distribution of test sequence in bag of system calls representation. If the divergence is under a user-specified threshold 8, then the test sequence is considered to be sim- In figure 5 , we show the result of the one class Naive Bayes algorithm in a bag of system calls representation on "UNM live Ipr" data set.
One class Naive Bayes performs effectively on the "UNM live Ipr" data set, but does not perform effectively on some of other data sets, especially when the data set is imbalanced.
D. Experimental Results on Unsupervised Anomaly Detection
In unsupervised anomaly detection, the learning alge rithm assumes that the input data set is composed of normal sequences and intrusion sequences, but the sequences are not explicitly labeled. Therefore, it assumes the data distribution is a mixture of the distribution of normal seqeunces and the intrusion seqeunces. We use k-Means clustering with k set to 2 for clustering normal and intrusion distributions. We evaluated the clustering based approach on "UNM live lpr" and "UNM synthetic sendmail" data. 
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have explored the use of a simple bag of system calls representation of system call sequences for intrusion detection. We constructed decision tree, Naive Bayes, decision list, and SVM and Logistic Regression classifiers for misuse detection. We constructed one class Naive Bayes algorithm and K-Means clustering for anomaly detection. In addition to the fact that we can use those standard machine learning methods, the proposed 'bag of system calls' representation has significant computational advantages over other approaches that have been reported in the literature.
Results of our experiments using widely used benchmark data sets -the University of New Mexico (UNM) and MIT Lincoln Lab (MIT LL) system call sequences show that the 
A . Discussion
When compared with the widely used fixed-length contiguous subsequence models, the bag uf system calls representation explored in this paper may seem somewhat simple. It may be argued that much more sophisticated models that take into account the identity of the user or perhaps the order in which the calls were made. But our experiments show that a much simpler approach may be adequate in many scenarios. The results of experiments described in this paper show that it is possible to achieve nearly perfect detection rates and €&e positive rates using a data representation that discards the relationship between syst8em call and originating process as well as the sequence structure of the calls within the traces.
al. [5] , 1181 showed that it is possible to achieve accurate anomaly detection using fixed-length contiguous subsequence representation of input data. In their approach, the detector will find anomalous subsequences right after they are executed depending on user-specified thresholds. The proposed 'bug of system calls representation has advantages that learning is faster, memory requirements are significantly lower, and simple counter program can discriminate normal sequences and abnormal sequences very quickly, before the process is terminated.
In these respects, a bag of system call representation is very suitable for protecting well known attacks and trivially modified attacks for IDS under time and space constraints. If the IDS needs to be built in real-time and the built system must be as light as possible to be able to work over limited resources, our approach will be a perfect fit because the generated IDS is simple and powerful to detect well known attacks. However, if the attacker knows the intrusion detection mechanism, our approach can be deceived by mimicry attacks i23]. Our future work will be €ocused on addressing this problem. 
B. Related Work
Warrender, Forrest, and Pearlmutter [I81 have presented several intrusion detection methods based upon system call trace data. They tested a method that utilizes sliding windows to determine a database of normal sequences to form a database for testing against test instances. They then used a similar method to compare windows in the test instances against the database and classify iiistances according to a function of the similarity of these sequences to those in the normal sequence database. The function requires sequential analysis of a window of system calls for each call made by a process. This requires the maintenance of a large database of normal system call trace sequences. The same authors have described a rule-based classification method that requires alterations to the training data to learn. This model involves prediction of the next system call to be made by a process given some number of calls made immediately before. This method requires enumeration of all unique system call traces within a given program. This is quite demanding on a learner, especially in a situation where the datasets are quite large indeed. Even the space requirements are quite large relative to the input dataset. Finally, classification time is high for such methods because (in the worst case) each rule needs to be checked for each Normalized frequency of audit data was used in SRI In NIDES, probability distribution of long NIDES [24] .
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